SUMMARY Intrusion detection system (IDS) has played a central role as an appliance tooliance toely defend our crucial computer systems or networks against attackers on the Internet. The most widely deployed and commercially available methods for intrusion detection employ signaturebased detection. However, they cannot detect unknown intrusions intrinsically which are not matched to the signatures, and their methods consume huge amounts of cost and time to acquire the signatures. In order to cope with the problems, many researchers have proposed various kinds of methods that are based on unsupervised learning techniques. Although they enable one to construct intrusion detection model with low cost and effort, and have capability to detect unforeseen attacks, they still have mainly two problems in intrusion detection: a low detection rate and a high false positive rate. In this paper, we present a new clustering method to improve the detection rate while maintaining a low false positive rate. We evaluated our method using KDD Cup 1999 data set. Evaluation results show that superiority of our approach to other existing algorithms reported in the literature. key words: intrusion detection system, clustering, detection rate, false positive rate
Introduction
In recent years, considerable attention has been given to intrusion detection on the Internet. Intrusion detection is defined as the process of monitoring the events occurring in a computer system or network and analyzing them for signs of intrusions [1] . Intrusion detection system (IDS) is one of the systems designed to perform such intrusion detection and an integral part of any complete security package of a modern well managed network system.
The most widely deployed and commercially available methods for intrusion detection employ signature-based detection. However, IDSs using these methods have several problems, for example, they cannot detect novel intrusions intrinsically which are not matched to the signatures, and their methods consume huge amounts of cost and time to ac- •EInitialization: Randomly choose k instances from data set and make them initial cluster centers.
•E Assignment: Assign each instance to the closest center.
•E Updating: Replace every cluster's center with the mean of its members.
• 
Merging
We first calculate the values as follows:
•E dij: the distance between cluster centers ci and cj Table 3 Average distance between each attack and the real normal data instances in the training data.
50.76 and 4.72, respectively. It obviously means that the initial cluster centers of the dense group are real normal, and those of the sparse group are real attack with high probability. Therefore, we conclude that the proposed initialization method can make appropriate initial cluster centers for intrusion detection, and performance of the proposed method was improved by using them. Also, the proposed labeling method is suitable for labeling the test data because it is based on the idea that the initial cluster centers from the dense group are normal. Although it was demonstrated that performance of the proposed method outperforms the other three algorithms, there is a limitation that the detection rate of all algorithms (including the proposed algorithm) cannot exceed 70% (i.e. the horizontal black dotted line in Fig. 2) , even when the false positive rate become higher. Hence, we investigated the data instances that were detected by each algorithm in order to identify cause of the limitation. From the investigation, we found that there are mainly two causes as follows.
First, we found that each algorithm could detect 31 attacks among 37 attacks in the test data excellently; that is, most of the remainder 6 attacks (i.e., back, mailbomb, snmpgetattack, snmpguess, worm and guess_passwd) were not correctly detected by each algorithm. Hence, we obtained new ROC curves for four algorithms over the test data that contain only the detectable 31-attacks. In the new ROC curves, as the false positive rate rises, the original black dotted line of Fig. 2 (i. e. the limitation on the detection rate) rose up to almost 100% while maintaining the same shape of curves as we had expected.
Second, as shown in Table 3 , we found that the undetectable 6-attacks are very similar to the normal data instances in the attribute values; that is, the distance from the undetectable 6-attacks to the real normal data instances is smaller than that from the detectable 31-attacks. From the fact, we conclude that because of similarity between the undetectable 6-attacks and normal data instances, the testing process classifies the undetectable 6-attacks as normal, so that the detection rate of each algorithm could not rise.
In our method, we deal with only the numerical features (i.e. dimensions) in the feature space even though we can adopt the symbolic and binary features to our scheme by transforming them to continuous features. Most commonly used method, for example, just replaces subsequent symbolic values with subsequent real numbers. However, there are several problems when adopting them to our scheme. 
